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TAKING ACTION AGAINST AUCTIONS: THE THIRD
CIRCUIT TASK FORCE REPORT
Jill E. Fisch*

INTRODUCTION

The Third Circuit has assumed a position of leadership in analyzing class
action litigation.1 Its reports, decisions and approaches have been intluentiaJ.2
Most recently, the Third Circuit created the Third Circuit Task Force on the
Selection of Class Counsel ("Task Force") to respond to new developments in
the procedures for selecting and compensating lead counsel, including the lead
counsel auction and the lead plaintiff provision of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA").3 The product of this Task Force, the Third
Circuit Task Force Report on Selection of Counsel ("Report"),4 continues the
tradition, and we can expect it to enjoy similar influence.
The Report is a thoughtful carefully researched attempt to evaluate recent
developments in the selection and compensation of class counsel and to provide
guidelines for future decision making. Its primary focus is the two developments
that motivated its preparation-the lead counsel auction and the lead plaintiff

•

Professor, Fordham Law School.

This review was written while the author was serving as

Sloan Visiting Professor at Georgetown University Law Center.
1. For example, the court's decisions in Lindy Bros. Builders v. Am. Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973) ("Lindy !")and Lindy Bros. Builders v. Am. Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp., 540 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1976) ("Lindy

!I")

established a widely imitated

prototype for application of the lodestar method of calculating attorneys fees.

In 1985. the court

formed a Task Force to consider the problems presented by the Lindy doctrine and to "begin(] the
process of seeking solutions for the deficiencies in current practice." Third Circuit Task Force, Court
Awarded Attorneys Fees, reprinted in 108 F.R.D. 237, 274 (1985). The Task Force produced a highly
regarded report on court awarded attorneys fees in class litigation. Recently, the court issued the first
circuit court opinion to evaluate the lead counsel auction. In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201,
270-71 (3d Cir. 2001).
2. See. e.g., Alan J. Tomkins & Thomas E. Willging, TAXATION OF ATTORNEYS' FEES:

I

PRACTICES IN ENGLISH, ALASKAN, AND FEDERAL COURTS 50-51 (1986) (describing Lindy

as

providing one of "two most influential fee calculation methodologies that emerged" during first
decade in which fee jurisprudence was developing); Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council
for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 563 (1986) (citing lodestar approach, as developed through Lindy

I

and

Lindy II. with approval); George B. Murr, Analysis of !he Valualion of Attorney Work Product
According to !he Markel for Claims: Reformula!ing 1he Lodes1ar Me1hod, 31 LOY.

U.

CHI. L.J. 599,

614-18 (2000) (describing impact of 1985 Report on subsequent fee determinations).
3. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
4. Third Circuit Task Force, Report on Selection of Class Counsel ("Report"), available al
http://www .ca3. uscourts.gov/classcounsel/final %20report%20of%20third%circuit%20task% 20force.p
df. reprinled in 74 TEMP. L. REV. 685 (2002).

Subsequent references will use the pagination of the

electronic version of the Report.
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provision of the PSLRA.5 Its target audience is the bench and bar. In particular.
the Report is designed to '·assist[J courts, especially new judges. in determining
how to proceed with appointment and compensation of counsel in class
actions."6
The Report's conclusions are straightforward. With respect to auctions. the
Report warns that their shortcomings are likely to outweigh their benefits.7
Similarly. although generally supportive of the empowered lead plaintiff
approach. the Report concludes that it too is untested and, accordingly, "declines
to recommend that the PSLRA model be extended to the appointment of
counsel in other kinds of class actions, such as antitrust cases."s The Report
concludes that courts should continue to employ traditional methods of selecting
and compensating class counsel, "with significant reliance on private orclering."9
Lead counsel auctions have enjoyed a fair amount of attention since the
highly publicized auctions in Cendant10 and Auction Houses,11 but there has been
relatively little careful analysis of the auction methodology.12 The Report makes
a valuable contribution by conducting a thorough analysis and by reaching
conclusions that are sound, clear and supported by the evidence. Drawing on an
empirical analysis of auction cases,13 the Report identifies a variety of problems
with the auction methodology, many of which are incompletely considered in
existing auction decisions. Although the Report is unlikely to dissuade auction
supporters, it should serve as a fair warning to others that auctions may not
deliver on their promises. Moreover, many of the principles addressed in the
Report can be extended beyond the auction context.
At 112 pages, 14 the Report demonstrates impressive depth. At the same
time, it leaves many questions unaddressed. The Report leaves for another clay
difficult normative assessments about the effectiveness of existing litigation
levels and the extent to which judges' opinions about the social value of litigation
should inform their fee determinations. The Report also emphasizes securities
and antitrust cases-areas in which there has already been extensive
experimentation. Neither the lead counsel auction nor the empowered lead
plaintiff model are well suited to mass torts or consumer fraud cases,15 yet the

5. See id. at 6 (observing that development of lead counsel auctions and empowered lead plaintiff
model ·'gave rise to the appointment of this Task Force.")
6. !d. at 12.
7. !d. at 49.

8. !d. at 94.
9. !d. at 18.

lO. In re Cendam Corp. Lilig., 264 F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 2001).
II. In re AuCiion Houses Antitrusc Licig., 197 F.R.D. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
12. See generally Jill E. Fisch, Lawyers on the Auction Block: Evaluating the SeleCiion of Class
Counsel by AtiCiion. 102 COLUM. L. REv. 650 (2002) (identifying limited scrutiny of auction approach
and offering comprehensive analysis of auction methodology).
13. Laura! L. Hooper and Marie Leary, Auctioning the Role of Class Coumel in Class ACiion
Cases: A Descriptive Study (Federal Judicial Center 2001) (FJC Report).
14. See Report. supra note 4.
15. See Fisch. mpra note 12. at 725-27.
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20(}l]

TAKING ACT/ON AGAINST AUCTIONS

limitations of private o rde ring
innovation.

in

8l5

these areas suggest a need for continued

I. THE AUCTION ANALYS!S

The Report devotes the majority of its attention to the lead counsel auction.
Reviewing the arguments concerning the auction procedure, the Report
concludes that the dominant justification offered in favor of auctions is lower fee
awards.16 The Report rejects this justification, finding both that the asserted
benefit is "speculative" and that it is outweighed by the costs and risks of the
auction procedure.17
The Report demonstrates that, as is true with many reform proposals, there
are substantial gaps between theory and practice. The auction theory literature
makes a variety of claims about efficiency and price production based on
assumptions about the auction context.18 In the case of lead counsel auctions,
assumptions about full information20 and adequate competition21 are generally
inappropriate. Even in situations in which these assumptions are accurate,
auction results may deviate substantially from theoretical predictions.l9 As a
result, lead counsel auctions are unlikely to minimize legal fees.22
Significantly, auctions cannot be defended by comparing the fee awards in
recent auction cases to the benchmarks that are commonly used in class action
litigation. Although a fee award of thirty-three percent or twenty-five percent is
appropriate in some cases, benchmarks are often used as a substitute for a
careful fee assessment. Ironically, the source of these benchmarks is the
16. Report, supra note 4, at 45 ("The major contention of auction proponents is that auctions
replicate the market and result in savings to the class due to lower counsel fees").
17. !d. at 49.

18. See Fisch, supra note 12. at 695-98 (describing auction theory literature).
19. Bid preparation requires the bidding firm to predict the expected recovery and the litigation
effort that will be required to obtain that recovery. Both predictions involve a range of variables that
are subject to considerable uncertainty. Among the issues that the firm must consider are the risk that
it will be unable to establish liability, the difficulty calculating damages. and the potential that the
defendant's financial resources will be insufficient to satisfy a judgment. See, e.g., Brenda Sandburg,
CEO Cleared in Rare Stock Drop Trial, THE RECORDER. Feb. 13, 2002 (observing that defense jury
verdict in Howard

v.

Everex Systems Inc.. 92-3742 was likely to affect how plaintiffs' lawyers value

future cases).
20. To date. kad counsel auctions have been conducted in only a handful of cases, but many of
those cases have involved a small number of few bids. See, e.g., Jill

E.

Fisch, Aggregation, AuCLions,

and Other Developments in the Selection of Lead Counsel Under the PSLRA, 64 LAW & CONTEMP.

PROBS. 53. 90 (Spring/Summer 2001) (describing bidder participation): FJC Report, supra note 13 at
14-19 (detailing numbers of submitted bids in various auction cases).
21. See, e.g., Tilman Borgers and Christian Dustmann, S1range Bids: Bidding Behavior in the
United Kingdom's Third Generation Spectrum Auction, at 7-8 (working paper 2001) (demonstrating
"large and systematic" deviations from theoretical predictions for bids in

UK spectrum license

auctions and consequently questioning whether auction results were efficient).
22. The Report goes on to reject the argument that fee minimization demonstrates the success of
an auction.

See Report. s11pra note 4. at 45.

Indeed, the Report identifies a variety of negative

consequences to the auction procedure. !d. In particular, the Report warns that auctions can sacrifice
total recovery in favor of a lower fee award. !d.

[Vol. 74

TEMPLE LAW REVIEW

816

marketplace to which auction proponents profess fidelity.23 The standard
perce ntage fee in traditional contingency fee agreements is one thircl.24 Taking
decisions like Synrhroid at their word, contingency agreements in comparable
individual lawsuits are an appropriate source of information on market rates.25
At the same time, it is unreasonable to defend auction results by comparing
thelll to statistical averages. Existing auction experience does not involve the
"typical" class action. Instead, auctions have been used in strong well-publicized
cases with substantial damages. Indeed, judges report that the cases most
suitable for an auction are those in which liability is clear, information about the
case is available in the public domain or from a criminal investigation, and
damages are substantial, offering the potential for a very large recovery.26 Cases
with those characteristics appear unlikely to warrant a benchmark fee award of
one third irrespective of the fee methodology employed by the court.
Moreover, courts already have the tools to avoid the wooden application of
a fixed benchmark. It is unnecessary to resort to an auction to reduce fees in
percentage terms. Decisions such as Goldberger v. integrated Resources, Inc. ,27
in re Prudential Insurance Co. of America Sales Practices Litigation,28 and In re
NASDAQ Market-Makers Antitrust Litigation,29 demonstrate the ability of
courts to scrutinize fee applications and award fees far below the traditional
benchmark without conducting an auction.
To the extent that judges rely on traditional benchmarks because they are
reluctant to conduct a more rigorous inquiry, the auction offers little hope of
improvement. The challenges of designing and implementing an appropriate
auction procedure limit the ease with which an auction can be deployed.30
Auctions are unlikely to generate competitive bids in precisely those cases in
which the fee determination process is most difficult, such as cases in which the
potential recovery is limited or where there is a substantial risk of nonrecovery.
Many such cases attract only a single firm and, under the current system, are
resolved by settlements and fee awards that receive little oversight or review.
23. See FJC Report,supra note 13. at 16 (finding that "the most common reason judges gave for
employing bidding was to foster competition among counsel by replicating the private marketplace for
legal services").

24. See Herbert M. Kritzer, The Wages of Risk: The Relurns of Comingency Fee Legal Praclice,
47 DEPAUL L REV. 267, 285-86 (1998) (explaining "[o)ne-third is the 'standard' contingency fee
figure''

and reporting survey results showing ninety-two percent of lawyers

employing a flat

percentage used a rate of thirty-three percent).
25. See In re Synthroid Mktg. Litig., 264 F.3d 712. 719 (7th Cir. 2001) (instructing courts to look
to prevailing market rates in determining fee award and citing fee agreements signed by individual
class m embers as one guide to such rates).
26. FJC Report, supra note 13, at SO.
27. 209 F.3d 43,44-45 (2d Cir. 2000) (upholding fee award of four percent of recovery).

-8. 106 F. Supp. 2d 721, 735-36 (D. N.J. 2000) (awarding fee of 4.8 percent of recovery in case
involring ·•extraordinary risk").
�9. 187 F.R.D. 465,470 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (awarding fee of fourteen percent of recovery).

30. See Paul Klemperer, What Really Matters in Auction Design 17 (Working Paper. June 21.
2000). available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=237114 (explaining importance
of auction design and risks of using inappropriately designed auction).
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Report correctly recognizes that these cases are unsuitable for an auction.31
Even the use of a carefully designed a uction provides no assurance that the
resulting fee is reasonable. The results of auction cases such as Cendant and
Aucrion Houses suggest reason to question auction results.32 Cendant was a
··simple case in terms of liability ... and the case was settled at a very early stage,
after little formal discovery."33 Nonetheless. the auction produced a fee of
approximately $ 10.861 per hour3� or a lodestar multiplier of 45.75.35 In Auction
Houses. plaintiffs were able to benefit from a concurrent aovernment
b
investigation,36 and the defendants were known to possess considerable financial
resources. In addition, the Auction Houses bidders had access to an unusual
amount of information about the case: interim lead counsel had hired experts to
prepare studies of potential damages, which were distributed to all the bidding
firms37 StilL the auction produced a fee of $26.75 million for less than six
months' work. Perhaps more troubling was that the second highest bid, which
would have won the auction if the Boies firm had not participated, would have
resulted in a total fee of $77 million.38
The

II. THE BIGGER PICTURE
The Report's detailed review of the auction process is a valuable service.
More important, however, the Report recognizes that, by using an auction,
courts may sacrifice class recovery in favor of minimizing legal fees.39 In class
litigation, results count. Any procedural tool or reform proposal must be
evaluated in terms of its ability to further the objectives of the litigation. In
representative litigation, in particular, judges must keep their eyes on the ball.
The relationship between counsel fees and litigation objectives has received
insufficient attention. Although traditional fee analysis purports to consider the
benefit provided to the plaintiff class,40 existing methodologies offer courts little
31. Report, supra note 4, at 70-72.
32. See Fisch, supra note 21. at 84-88 (evaluating results in several auction cases).
33. In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201. 285 (3d Cir. 2001).
34. Memorandum of Law by Corporation Counsel of the City of New York in Opposition to the
Application of Lead Counsel for Attorneys· Fees at 1. 9. In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 191 F.R.D. 387
(D. N.J. 1998) (No. 98-CY-1664).
35. In re Cendan1. 264 F.3d at 285.
36. In re Auction Houses Antitrust Lirig. 197 F.R.D. 71, 74 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
.

37. !d.
38. See Fisch, supra note 12. at 684.
39. Report. supra note 4. at 45.

From the perspective of plaintiff class, a total recovery of $1

million of which counsel receives a fifty percent fee is more attractive than a total recovery of
$250,000. of which counsel receives ten percent.

As in traditional litigation. the potential for the

interests of lawyer and client to diverge increases as counsel's percentage interest in the lawsuit
decreases.

Fee structures in which counsel receives

a

very low fee in percentage terms-particularly

when that percentage is set ex ante-can create substantial agency problems. See Fisch, supra note 12.
at 678-79.
40. Thomas

E.

Willging et al., An Empirical Analysis of Rule 23 to A ddress the Rulemaking

Challenges. 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74. 162 (1 996) (studying fee awards and identifying as indicators that
the court considered class benefit

"(I)

use

of percentage-of-recovery method, (2) any adjustments to
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guidance as to how to incorporate an assessment of litigation value into their
analysis.
Class actions serve a variety of objectives, including identification of
wrongdoing. victim compensation and deterrence of misconduct.�1 A court can
compare the size of the recovery to the damages suffered by class victims to
approximate the extent to which the recovery compensates class members.
Similarly, although a court cannot predict the effect of a particular resolution on
future wrongdoing. because wrongdoers are held accountable when they are
required to pay in accordance with the damages that they intlict, recovery size
can also be used as a proxy for deterrence effect.�2
Assessing the full social value of class litigation is more difficult. First. the
benefits provided by the litigation must be measured against the litigation costs.
Second, the private costs and benefits of litigation may diverge from the social
costs and benefits.43 This raises the question whether the judge. in monitoring
representative litigation, should attempt merely to replicate the theoretical result
of a traditional lawsuit or should consider broader societal interests. In
particular, because the costs of litigation are frequently passed on in the market.
it is not socially desirable to pursue every meritorious claim.44 Third. a
resolution may favor one objective over another.45 How should a court choose
between compensation and deterrence? Fourth, a court cannot assess the value
of a particular case in isolation. The deterrence effect of a single judgment, for
example, depends on how it affects the actual and perceived likelihood that
future wrongdoers will be held accountable.46
Finally, the court must consider the impact of its fee award on counsel's

lodestar amount based on results achieved,and (3) whether court considered any fee objections"').
41. See, e.g., Stephen Calkins, A n Enforcement Official's Reflections on A nritrust Class Acrions.
39 ARIZ. L. REv. 413, 439-40 ( 1997) (identifying deterrence, compensation and identification of
wrongdoing as social objectives of class action litigation).
42. But see James D. Cox. Private Litigaiion and the Deterrence of Corporme Misconduct, 60 LAw

& CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (Autumn 1997) (examining relationship between compensation and deterrt:!nce
objectives of

civil litigation and questioning whether

compensation-based damages

maximize

deterrence).

Moreover, from a deterrence perspective, damages need not be paid to the victims of

misconduct.

For deterrence purposes. the allocation of the recovery between class members. class

counsel, and even the U.S. Treasury, is largely irrelevant. See Jill

E.

Fisch. Class A uion Reform. Qui

Tam. and the Role of the Plaintiff, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167. 182-83 (Autumn 1997) (exploring
alternative methods of calculating and awarding damages to further deterrence objective).
43. See, e.g., Kathryn

E.

Spier, A Note on the Divergence between the Private and rhe Social

Motive to Settle under a Negligence Rule, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 613. 613-15 (1997) (describing possible
divergence between private incentives and social value of litigation).
44. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter & Edward L. Rubin, Orders and Incentives as Regulatory
lv!ethods: The Expedited Funds A vailability Act of 1987, 35 UCLA L. REV. 1115. 1172

(1988)

(explaining that litigation expenses of civil enforcement will be borne by customers).
45. See Fisch. supra note 42, at 174-75 (demonstrating how increased focus on deterrence rather
than compensation has led to structural changes in class litigation).
46. A full analysis of deterrence theory is beyond the scope of this review. See generally John T.
Scholz. Enforcement Policy and Corporate lv!isconduct: The Changing PerspeCiive

of

Deterrence

Theory, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 253 (Summer 1997) (describing simple model of deterrence
theory and complications identified through recent empirical research).

1
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litigation incentives. As the Report recognizes, class litigation is lawyer driven.-17
Litigation decisions in common fund cases are influenced by counsel's financial
incentives.

Cases will not be litigated unless they offer a sufficient reward for

entrepreneurial lawyers to act as private attorneys generaJ.-ll.'
Should a court consider social as well as private value in determining legal
fees?

To what extent should the court attempt to influence future litigation

levels through the structure and size of its fee awards?

The answers to these

questions depend on normative judgments about the appropriate role

of

representative litigation and are clearly beyond the scope of the current Report.
Nonetheless, beginning the inquiry would be a valuable endeavor. In particular.
answers to these questions may resolve many of the current debates over
process.

For example, the argument that legal fees in class actions should be

based on market rates presumes that fees should only reflect the value provided
to the plaintiff class. Similarly, the auction procedure cannot be used to capture
the social value of litigation. In comparison, the most compelling defense for ex
post fee determinations is that they empower the judge to reflect both the public
and the private benefits provided by the litigation in the fee award.
The extent to which the class action mechanism should be structured to
increase deterrence is politically controversial.49

Similarly, the appropriate

balance between government and private enforcement is unclear.50 In addition.
a variety of factors affect the effectiveness of civil litigation in addressing
wrongdoing.

Nonetheless, legal reforms that reduce the viability of the class

action create a legal climate that contributes to corporate misconduct.
commentators,

for

example,

have

wrongdoing at Enron possible.51
the

inability

of

asserted

that

such

reforms

Some

made

the

Certainly the Enron experience demonstrates

government regulation and

criminal

law to

prevent

the

widespread dislocations caused by corporate misconduct. In a post-Enron world,
the continued availability of the class action mechanism as a tool for victim

47. Report. supra note 4. at 3.
48. See Fisch, supra note 42, at 173-75 (describing financial incentives for class counsel to act as
private attorneys general).

4\1. See e.g., A.C. Pritchard, Markers as lvfonirors: A Proposal to Replace Class Acriom with
,

Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers. 85 VA. L. REV. 925 . 929-30 (1999) (arguing that deterrence
rather than compensation should be primary goal in securities fraud litigation).

50. See Fisch, supra note 42. at 198-201 (proposing extension of qui tam model to permit
coordination between government and private enforcement efforts).
51. See, e.g., Stephen Labaton. Now Who, Exacrly, Col Us inro This?, N.Y. TIMES. Feb. 3. 2002. §

3. at l. col. 5 (quoting Barbara Roper, director of investor protection at the Consumer Federation of
America. arguing that Congress. by adopting the PSLRA, helped create environment that led to
Enron-Anderson scandal.) The PSLRA enacted
a

a

variety of curbs on private civil litigation including

limitation on the liability exposure of auditors. a heightened pleading requirement. and a discovery

stay during the pendency of a motion to dismiss. See Joel Seligman, The Private Securities Reform Act
of 1995. 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 717,725-31 (1996). Ironically, the PSLRA also enacted the statutory lead
plaintiff provision. !d. at 726. Although the Report questions the feasibility of the empowered lead
plaintiff model, I have argued elsewhere that the model offers substantial promise for addressing many
issues in the selection and compensation of class counsel.

See Fisch. supra note 12, at 710-14

(describing the advantages of the empowered lead plaintiff model).
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compensation and deterrence of wrongdoing has become increasingly important.
If civil litigation is to serve broader social goals. these considerations must
be reflected in class action fee awards. Repeated downward pressure on counsel
fees weakens the driving force behind entrepreneurial litigation.

Consequently,

the impact of fee minimization can extend beyond any particular case.

If fee

awards are systematically too low, they will provide plaintiffs lawyers with
insufficient incentives to litigate, resulting in suboptimal litigation levels. In the
short run. lawyers will file fewer cases. In the long run, legal talent will be driven
away from the plaintiffs bar to areas of greater financial reward. From a societal
perspective. the resulting costs will be inadequate compensation and excessive
levels of misconduct.
CONCLUSION
In its recent Report, the Third Circuit Task Force acknowledges the
important role of the class action in identifying and rectifying public harms. The
Report recognizes that well-intentioned reform efforts may interfere with the
ability of class actions to perform that role.
conservative

to

demand

that

proponents

Although it may appear unduly
of

regulatory

reform

clearly

demonstrate the efficacy of their proposals, the Report fairly judges that, with
respect to lead counsel auctions, the supporters have not made their case.

